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POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSITION: WHO PARTICIPATED, 
AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS, IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE? 
James R. Kluegel 
and 
David S. Mason 
ABSTRACT 
Using surveys conducted in 1991, this paper examines the sociodemographic, 
experiential and ideological determinants of nonelectoral and electoral political 
participation in eight postcommunist states of eastern Europe, with comparisons to 
Germany and the United States. Comparing the postcommunist states to the 
capitalist ones, we find the determinants of participation in the former largely 
conform to the patterns in the west, with education playing an especially large role. 
In the postcommunist states, we found that youth, political anger and antisocialist 
ideology were important determinants of political protest and party sympathy, but 
not of the decision to vote in the initial elections. This may have contributed to the 
elite-mass divisions in these countries, where the elite promoted market-oriented 
reforms, and the populations responded with II left turns II in subsequent rounds of 
elections. 1 
INDRODUCTION 
The study of who participates in politics and how they do so is a longstanding interest in 
western social science. In one tradition, who participates is analyzed in the context of 
normative theories of democracy, with questions about the extent of political participation and 
the consequences for democracy of the kinds of selective participation that prevail in different 
societies (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1971; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Barnes, Kaase et 
al. 1979). In a second tradition the question of who participates is raised in the context of the 
broader study of social movements and social change. Such research attempts to answer 
questions about how social movements are formed, the conditions that make them powerful (or 
weak), and the ways in which people are attracted to participate in them. Although the study of 
1For a more detailed analysis of this, perhaps the most important finding for current developments, please 
see the passages following the "Second" conclusion on pages 20-22. [NCSEER NOTE] 
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social movements often is approached from a "macro" level perspective, such as resource 
mobilization theory (Jenkins 1983), social movement theory also poses questions about who 
participates that can best be addressed by individual level analyses (Opp, 1989). In both 
traditions, research has focused on participation and political action in western countries, 
primarily in North America and West Europe. 
To date there has been very little empirical analysis by either tradition of participation in 
the communist or the post-communist states. From the communist era, this lacuna was a result 
both of skimpy data on political attitudes and behavior and, to the extent that such data was 
available, its relative insignificance in societies where political participation was both limited 
and controlled. What little information we did have was often gleaned from unrepresentative 
groups, e.g. from Soviet emigres (Millar 1987) or from East European travelers in the West 
(McIntosh 1986). The exception to this was during brief periods of liberalization when surveys 
became more open and more revealing, for example during the 1968 "Prague Spring" 
(Piekalkiewicz 1972) or the first Solidarity era in Poland (Mason 1985). In the postcommunist 
period these problems have disappeared, but despite the widespread attention to 
democratization, there has been little analysis of political participation. The burgeoning number 
of representative surveys in these countries tend to focus on attitudes rather than behavior (e.g. 
Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1994; Finifter and Mickiewicz 
1992; McIntosh et al. 1994), providing little opportunity for "micro" level analysis of 
participation. The same problems with lack of participation data from eastern Europe also 
explains the lack of any "east-west" comparative analysis of participation, either during the 
communist era or afterwards. 
As Kaplan (1993) has noted, however, we are now in a position to establish a new 
broader understanding of political participation in the past and present in eastern Europe. This 
will also facilitate generalizations about political participation across political systems and allow 
comparisons of participation and political action between the established democracies of the 
"west" and the emerging ones in the "east" of Europe. This paper presents research in this 
vein, based on 1991 survey data taken from the International Social Justice Project (ISJP). Our 
research focuses on the sociodemographic, experiential and ideological determinants of 
nonelectoral and electoral political participation in eight post-communist states in eastern 
Europe, with comparable data from western Germany, and the United States. 
2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Our research is of the type Kohn (1989) calls "nation as context" studies. Such studies 
seek to test the generality of theory and research findings in a comparative framework, to see 
if similar processes hold in diverse nations. Our first major interest in this paper, then, is 
examining whether theoretical perspectives and findings generated in research from Western 
nations help us understand political participation in central and Eastern Europe. 
Opp and colleagues in several publications have explicated a model of participation in 
political protest, "Value Expectancy Theory," that we call upon in our analyses (Opp 1993). 
They have examined the merits of their perspective in analyses of protest demonstration 
involvement in (former) West Germany, the U.S.A, (Opp 1988, 1989; Opp and Roehl 1990) 
and of direct relevance to this study, in the protest demonstrations in Leipzig in 1989 (Opp and 
Gem 1993). 
In short, Value Expectancy Theory, (Opp 1992: 14) is "a variant of the model of rational 
action ... According to this theory, individuals perform an action if they value the expected 
consequences to a high extent and if they attribute a relative high degree of certainty to the 
occurrence of these consequences." This perspective emphasizes the role of incentives to 
participate in protest movements of three kinds, public goods motivation, moral incentives, and 
social incentives (Opp and Gem 1993). "Public goods motivation" is produced by 
dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods. Its influence, according to this theory, is 
mediated by the perceived efficacy of protest action, such that dissatisfaction will produce 
political action when people believe that their participation will affect the outcome of a 
movement. A "moral incentive" is produced by a sense of obligation to take political action. 
and a "social incentive" results from such things as the encouragement of friends or salient 
groups to participate. Value Expectancy Theory has been shown to hold in the U.S., in West 
Germany and one region of East Germany. Does it have broader merit in the postcommunist 
states? 
We also call upon the work of Barnes and Kaase (1979). Like Value Expectancy Theory, 
they take a "rational actor" approach, seeing participation as the result of a rational means-end 
calculation that involves both motivation and the cognitive capabilities to make effective 
choices among the range of political actions. Indeed, at the operational level one finds that Opp 
and colleagues, and Barnes and Kaase employ the same or quite similar measures of variables 
in their analyses of political participation data. Barnes and Kaase, however, analyze political 
participation more broadly than Opp and colleagues, examining both "unconventional" and 
"conventional" political action. Their category of "unconventional" action includes participation 
in protest movements as addressed by Value Expectancy Theory. In addition, they apply their 
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micro model of participation to electoral behavior, i.e. to traditional or II conventional II political 
action. 
We draw from both perspectives in structuring our analysis of participation. Following 
Barnes and Kaase we examine both non-electoral and electoral political participation. We 
examine two kinds of electoral participation during the early transition, rudimentary political 
party attachment and voting during the most recent national elections in each country -- which 
in the case of the postcommunist states is the initial election following the revolution of 1989. 
Following Opp and colleagues, we focus most extensively on the determinants of two kinds of 
collective protest action that are of most interest to students of social movement participation. 
Specifically, we examine the determinants of participation in protest demonstrations and rallies, 
and "aggressive" political action. To participate in a demonstration or rally is to clearly send a 
collective message of protest, as opposed to more individualist actions such as contacting a 
legislator, signing a petition, joining an economic boycott. or even simply attending a public 
meeting. As defined by Muller (1979), "aggressive political participation" in addition to being 
action as part of a collectivity is by law or regime norms seen as illegal, and involves an 
attempt to disrupt the normal functioning of government. 
A second major interest we pursue in this paper is profiling the sociodemographic 
characteristics and political-economic beliefs and attitudes of political "participators" in the 
early transition period. In doing so, one aim is to provide a baseline view of political 
participation useful for understanding political change during the transition era. Such a profile, 
for example, may help explain the success of market-oriented political parties and candidates in 
the initial elections of the transition, and the subsequent strong showings by left-wing political 
parties in the second round of elections. 
Of particular interest to understanding political change over the transition era is the social 
and ideological representativeness of political activists in the early transition years. Studies in 
both the United States (Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie 1993) and in western Europe 
(Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979) have pointed out that more 
socioeconomically advantaged groups are more likely to participate in politics and "that those 
who are already well off tend to benefit more from governmental policies because they have 
greater influence on such policies" (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 5). However, these same 
studies have found that despite the demographic differences between participants and non-
participants, there are inconsequential differences in certain economic attitudes of the active 
and inactive in western countries, and this somewhat mutes the problem of the socioeconomic 
differences (Verba et al. 1993). Some analysts of the transition processes in eastern Europe 
have raised similar questions about the representativeness, both in terms of status and attitudes, 
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of those in power in the post-communist states (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1992; Tymowski 1993; 
Kolarska-Bobinska 1994). 
The success of market-oriented politics in the early transition may have in important part 
been due to the "unrepresentativeness" of political activists during the early transition. If these 
early transition activists were substantially more supportive of market reforms than those less 
or not at all politically involved then they likely had a greater influence on selecting political 
candidates and shaping the agenda of the nascent political parties of the time. The growth in 
strength of political parties on the left may have resulted from a growing "representativeness" 
of political activists (at least on political-attitudinal grounds) during the middle transition 
years -- i.e., from the reentry into the political arena of the non-participants of the early 
transition period. 
DATA 
We employ data from surveys conducted in eight Central and Eastern European 
countries: Bulgaria (n=l,045), Czechoslovakia (n=l,181), Estonia (n=l,000), (former) East 
Germany (n= 1,019), Hungary (n= 1,000), Poland (n= 1,542), Russia (n= 1,734), and Slovenia 
(n= 1,375). To allow cross-system comparison -- between postcommunist and western 
democratic countries -- we also analyze data from two Western democracies: (former) West 
Germany (1,837), and the U.S.A. (1,414). 2 The same survey was administered in all countries 
in spring to fall of 1991 (except Estonia where data were collected in the spring of 1992), as 
part of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), a broader 13 nation study of public 
opinion about economic and political justice. 3 
2 Surveys also were conducted in Great Britain, Japan and the Netherlands. We chose West Germany 
and the U.S.A. because data from these countries are the most frequently analyzed in research on political 
participation in general, and especially on social movement participation in particular. 
3Tbe International Social Justice Project is a collaborative research effort, supported in whole or part by 
each of the following organizations: The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (USA); the 
National Science Foundation (USA); the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); the Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan; OTKA [National Scientific Research Fund] (Hungary); the Economic 
and Social Research Council (UK); the Deutsche Forshcungsgemeinschaft (Germany); Institute of Social 
Science, Chuo University (Japan); The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs; the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; 
the Grant Agency of the Czechoslavak Academy of Sciences; Saar Poll, Limited (Estonia); the Minstry of 
Science and Technology, Republic of Slovenia; the State Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Bada 
Naukowych, Poland). 
The principal investigators in the development of these data were as follows: Galin Gomev (Bulgaria), Petr 
Mateju (the Czech Republic), Andrus Saar (Estonia); Bernd Wegener (Germany), Gordon Marshall, Adam 
Swift and Carole Burgoyne (UK) Gyorgy Csepeli, Antal Orkeny, Tamas Kolosi and Maria Nemenyi (Hungary), 
Masaru Miyano and Akihiro Ishikawa (Japan), Wil Arts and Piet Hennkens (the Netherlands), Bogdan 
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The original questionnaire was written in English and translated into the principal 
language of each country. (In Czechoslovakia the questionnaire was translated into both Czech 
and Slovak, and in Estonia it was translated into both Estonian and Russian.) Iterative back-
translation of the questionnaire to English was performed to validate the translation into a non-
English language. Samples were drawn to be randomly representative of each countries 
population. Face to face interviews were conducted in all countries, except the U.S., where 
interviews were conducted by telephone. Response rates for the ten countries analyzed in this 
study are 70 percent or higher. 
MEASURES 
Participation 
To measure non-electoral or unconventional political participation we asked respondents 
to indicate whether or not they had ever done any of a list of ten protest activities. The specific 
question is worded as follows: 
On this card are kinds of actions that people sometimes take to make their own views 
publicly known and to influence others when they see injustice [emphasis added]. Please 
tell me if you have ever done any of these things over an issue that was important to 
you. 
1. Signed a petition (PETITION); 
2. Joined in a boycott (BOYCOTT); 
3. Attended a protest demonstration or rally (RALLY); 
4. Attended a public meeting (PUBLIC MEETING); 
5. Joined an unofficial strike (STRIKE); 
6. Blocked traffic (TRAFFIC); 
7. Written to a newspaper (NEWSPAPER); 
8. Written to your (Member of the National/Federal Legislature)? (LETTER); 
9. Refused to pay rent, rates or taxes (REFUSED); 
10. Occupied a building or property in protest (OCCUPIED). 
Two things about this question deserve note. First, we asked about political participation 
in broad categories. Some respondents may have reported activities that conceivably fit within 
these categories, but are done for no political intent. However, we underscore that in order to 
specify the scope of activities of interest the question concerns participation "in response to 
Cbicomski and Witold Morawski (Poland), Ludmilla Khakulina and Svetlana Sydorenlco (Russia), Vojko 
Antoncic (Slovenia). 
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seeing an injustice." Second, we asked about retrospective political participation, which in 
some cases is cumulated over a lengthy lifetime. We are limited, accordingly, to examining 
relationships between respondent characteristics at a given date in 1991 and participation that 
took place before that date. To make strong inferences about the influence of a factor on 
participation, we must assume that the value of that factor for a given person in 1991 is 
strongly correlated with the value of that factor when they engaged in political action. For 
sociodemographic variables such as education and gender, this assumption is reasonable in 
analyses of adult respondents. It is more problematic for social psychological variables such as 
social and political attitudes or personal dissatisfactions. The results we give for the effects of 
social-psychological variables on nonelectoral participation, then, should be viewed as 
somewhat less reliable than estimated effects of sociodemographic variables. 
Electoral participation is measured by two questions: PAR TY SYMPATHY is indicated 
by responses to the question: 
"People sometimes sympathize with one particular party. Do you sympathize with a 
particular party?" (response format "Yes" or "No" "yes" coded "1" and "no" 
coded "O" for analyses). 
VOTE is indicated by responses to the question: 
"Did you vote in the last (National/Federal/Parliamentary) election in (year)? 
(response format "Yes" or "No" "yes" coded " 1 " and "no" coded "0" for 
analyses). 
We did not employ the commonly used measure of party identification, because it 
implies the existence of parties over a period of time in which identification can develop. In 
the postcommunist states of 1991, most political parties had been newly formed and citizens of 
these states had little time to develop "identification" with them. Thus we used a question 
about the more broadly applicable notion of party sympathy to measure if respondents used 
political parties as a guide to political action. 
Our measures of participation are subject to the potential distortions of any self-reports 
(cf Opp and Gem 1993). Objective measures of non-electoral participation are difficult to 
obtain, especially, for the postcommunist states. 4 We can more readily validate self-reported 
41n their random sample of Leipzig residents, Opp and Gem (1993) found that approximately 39 percent of 
respondents reported involvement in the demonstrations of the fall of 1989. Highly consistent with this result, 
we find (Table 1) that roughly 43 percent of East Germans overall report ever having participated in a rally or 
protest demonstration. These figures compare with an "official" estimate cited by Opp and Gem (1993) of 
roughly 24 percent participation in Leipzig. They argue that the "official" estimate is no doubt in error and the 
true percent lies somewhere between these two numbers. 
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voting. The percents reporting that they voted in the most recent election is quite close to the 
objective indication in all countries, except for the United States.5 Because research indicates 
that the highly educated are more likely than other groups to incorrectly report that they have 
voted, it is likely that the strength of relationship between education and voting for the U.S. is 
somewhat overstated (Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986). If the tendency to overreport 
voting in the United States generalizes, than it is likely that the levels of non-electoral political 
participation reported by U.S. respondents also are exaggerated. On the positive side, if the 
accurate reporting of voting in the other countries generalizes, than we may be confident as 
well about the accuracy of reports of non-electoral participation. 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
Age is measured in years. To represent possible generational differences in participation, 
we created four categorical ( 1,0) variables for respondents 29 years old and younger. 30 to 45 
years old, 46 to 59 years old, and ages 60 and older. Gender is a 1,0 variable, with "1" 
assigned to males. Education is measured in CASMIN levels, i.e. in seven categories from less 
than primary education to higher tertiary (Konig et al. 1988). We employ two measures of 
economic status. Income Need is based on the respondent's assessment of whether her or his 
family income is "much less than that needed" "somewhat less than that needed" "about what 
is needed" or "somewhat more than needed" or "much more than needed" -- on a scale from 1 
to 5, with 5 indicating "much more than needed." This measure allows us to assess the effects 
of income across countries in subjectively comparable terms. Perceived Social Standing is 
measured on a ten category scale with "l" low and "10" high. We use this item as a measure 
of status position, because it also is subjectively comparable across countries. and may be used 
for respondents not currently in the labor force (unlike occupational prestige). 
Social Psychological Factors 
Personal Grievance: Extant research presents a body of clearly negative findings regarding the 
influence of simple deprivation or dissatisfactions with income or other aspects of one's 
personal life on political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Opp 1989). In order for the 
'The turnout for the most recent election prior to our surveys in countries other than the U.S.A. is 1) 
Czechoslovakia, June 1990 federal parliament election, 95% 2) Eastern Germany, June 1990 all-Germany 
parliament (eastern turnout), 75% 3) Hungary, June 1990 parliament (1st round of 2), 68% 4) Poland, 
November 12, 1990 presidential election (2nd round), 63 % 5) Russia, June 1991 presidential election, 74% 6) 
West Germany, June 1990 all-German parliament (west turnout) 79%. 
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experience of deprivation to have consequences for political action it must be seen as 
illegitimate or unfair (Dahl 1971), i.e. cast in an "injustice frame" (Gamson, 1992). 
Accordingly, we employ a question asking about the experience of injustice: 
"Sometimes people experience injustice in their lives. How often have you personally 
experienced injustice because of the following factors? Was it very often, often, 
sometimes, rarely or never? How about 1) your religious beliefs 2) your sex 3) your 
social background 4) your age 5) a lack of money 6) the part of the county you are from 
7) your political beliefs 8) your race or ethnic group." (For analyses, "very often" 1s 
coded "5", "never" is coded "1", and other responses are coded accordingly.) 
Social and Political Beliefs: We use three measures that correspond to the concepts of social 
and moral incentives from Value Expectancy Theory (Opp and Gem 1983) and fit within the 
concept of "political dissatisfaction" as defined by Barnes and Kaase (1979). 
The first, EGALITARIAN STA TISM, averages scores on four items indicating support 
for egalitarian principles of distribution and support for government intervention to reduce 
inequality. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate support for strict equality and need 
as general principles of a fair distribution, and support for government intervention to place an 
upper limit on income and to guarantee jobs. 6 We constructed this measure to gauge support 
for important policies and values associated with state socialist regimes. These items were used 
in all ISJP countries, and we therefore can compare effects in both postcommunist and western 
countries. 
The second, is an item indicating support for socialism per se (FAVOR SOCIALISM). 
Respondents in only the postcommunist countries were asked: 
"People have different views about socialism. Based on your experience in (COUNTRY 
NAME) of socialism, would you say that you are very much in favor, somewhat in 
favor, neither for nor against, somewhat against, or totally against socialism?" [Very 
much in favor is given a score of "5" and other responses scored accordingly.] 
6An average for each respondents was calculated for responses to four questions: (l)The fairest way of 
distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares. (2)The most important thing is that 
people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they 
need. (3)The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make. (4)The 
government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. A five point response format--strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree--was used for each of these questions. A high 
score on this scale indicates strong support for egalitarianism and government intervention to implement it. 
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The third is a measure of lnglehart's (1979) concept of POST-MATERIALISM. Based 
on respondents' rankings of four political goals we constructed a measure indicating support 
for the values of giving people more say in government and protecting freedom of speech over 
maintaining order in the country and fighting rising prices. 7 A high score on this measure 
indicates stronger support for the values of giving people more say and protecting freedom of 
speech. 
We take these three measures as indicators of personal values along three critical social 
and moral dimensions affecting the desire for social change, i.e. of the value assigned to 
equality vs. inequality, the legitimacy granted to a form of government, and to freedom vs. 
order. One's position on these dimensions, then, may be seen as providing important incentives 
to political action. In the postcommunist states, antiegalitarianism (opposition to Egalitarian 
Statism) provided a strong social incentive to seek change under the (at least officially) 
egalitarian ideology of Soviet communism. Opposition to socialism may be based on 
antiegalitarianism, but also may stem from other sources. Persons in postcommunist states 
holding egalitarian values may have come to oppose socialism as a form of government alone -
- because of its association with corruption and repression, or on other such grounds not 
involving issues of distributive justice. Attaching high value to freedom of speech and 
democratic participation in government decision-making in the Communist era should provide a 
strong sense of obligation to participate in democratic activities when opportunities to do so 
became available. 
Perceived Effectiveness of Political Action: We use a single item measure that 
corresponds most closely to the perceived efficacy of political action emphasized by Value 
Expectancy Theory and the perceived responsiveness of the political system emphasized by 
Barnes and Kaase (1979). SOCIAL JUSTICE IS POSSIBLE is measured by responses to the 
question: 
7The following question is used to measure Post-Materialism: "I will read a list of political goals. 
Suppose you had to choose among them. Which would be most important to you? . . . And which would be the 
second most important? ... And what would be your third choice? l. Maintain order in the country, 2. Give 
people more say in the decisions of government, 3. Fight rising prices, 4. Protect freedom of speech." "Pure 
post-materialists,• those selecting both post-materialist political goals (goals •r and "4") are assigned a score of 
"4. • "Pure materialists," those selecting both materialist political goals (goals "l" and "3") are assigned scores 
of "1. • Correspondingly, "mixed materialists" are given scores of •3• (mixed post-materialist ranking a post-
materialist goal higher than a materialist goal) or "2" (mixed materialist ranking a materialist goal higher than a 
post-materialist goal). 
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"There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things. 
(Response format: (1) strongly agree (2) agree (3) neither agree nor disagree (4) disagree 
(5) strongly disagree; the higher the score the more a respondent disagrees that social 
justice is .!]Q1 possible, or agrees that it is possible.)" 
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Non-Electoral Participation 
The top panel of Table 1 (page 25) presents the distribution by country of the percent 
who have ever participated in each of six individual types of non-electoral participation, and of 
a combination of three of them we label AGGRESSIVE participation. Following Muller's 
(1979) definition (see above) we consider someone to have participated in Aggressive 
participation if she or he has ever joined an unofficial strike or blocked traffic or occupied a 
building or property in protest. Two summary measures of non-electoral participation are 
presented in the far right-hand columns of Table 1. The ANY column gives the percent who 
have participated in any one of nine political activities (the item REFUSED was excluded from 
analyses due to a factor analysis suggesting it was inconsistently interpreted across countries). 
The MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION column gives the average number of political activities 
(out of nine total) in which people ever participated. 
One striking aspect of this table is the low level of political activity in five of the post-
communist states. In Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia, the large majority of the 
population had participated in none of the nine forms of non-electoral political activity we 
consider here (" ANY" in the table). It should be re-emphasized that these questions asked 
about such activity over the lifetime, so it is apparent that these people were politically inactive 
both in the communist era, when the regimes encouraged formal political participation. and in 
the revolutionary one, when thousands of people took to the streets in demonstrations, protests. 
and rallies. Despite the fact that these countries had just been through revolutionary overthrows 
of their governments, the overall level of political activity was much less than that in the three 
western countries in our sample: on average 30% or fewer of the citizens of these five 
postcommunist states had participated in any of the nine forms of non-electoral political 
activity, compared to 69% in (former) West Germany and 90% in the U.S. The average 
person in these postcommunist countries had participated in less than one activity, while the 
average in West Germany is nearly two and nearly three in the U.S. 
The level of non-electoral political action in East Germany and Czechoslovakia (and, to a 
lesser extent, Bulgaria) is much higher than the other eastern countries, and approaches the 
levels of the western countries. The higher levels of participation in these countries prevail for 
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both overall political activity (ANY and MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION) and for individual 
types of participation. It was these three countries where the communist governments were 
brought down by mass demonstrations and "people power" (especially in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia) whereas in the other countries the transition was more evolutionary (e.g. 
Poland) or was managed by the political elite (Hungary). Thus, there were more opportunities 
for people to participate in the large organized protests in 1989, and these show up in the 
table. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 gives the figures for electoral participation. In most of the 
postcommunist states, less than a third of the respondents "sympathized with a particular 
[political] party." Only in eastern Germany, which had by this time been integrated into the 
fully formed political structure of the west, did a majority of respondents express such 
affiliation. In part, this reluctance to identify with political parties was due to the weak 
structure and development of party systems throughout the region at this early stage of the 
transition. In both Poland and Hungary, for example, there were dozens of political parties and 
groups vying for parliamentary office. This may have been bewildering to many potential 
voters, but the lack of effective party organizations effectively excluded much of the population 
from political participation and influence. 
Only with voting do we see widespread democratic participation, with the overwhelming 
majority of the population in each country voting in the first free or semi-free parliamentary 
elections in 1989-1991. But self-reported electoral turnout in Poland and Hungary was not 
much higher than that in the United States and in other postcommunist states it was near that of 
West Germany -- even with the excitement of the first stab at democracy. And in all of these 
countries. voter turnout dropped sharply in succeeding elections. at both national and 
regional/local levels. 8 
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICIPATION 
Table 2 (pages 26-27) reports regression results for two types each of non-electoral and 
electoral participation on sociodemographic characteristics. Because our participation measures 
8In Poland's first semi-democratic elections in June I 989, voter turnout was 63 % , but dropped off sharply to 
42 % in local elections the next year and in subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections was never higher 
than 53%. In Czechoslovakia, turnout dropped from 95% in the June 1990 parliamentary elections to 85% in 
the June 1992 elections. In Russia, 74% voted in the presidential elections in June 1991; 55 % did in the 
parliamentary elections of December 1993. In Hungary, 68% voted in the first round of the parliamentary 
elections in March 1990; only 46% in the second round. In the local elections later that year, the 36% turnout 
was below the legal requirement, leading to a second round when the turnout was only 28 % . 
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are all categorical variables (0, 1), logistic regression procedures are employed. The 
coefficients given in Tables 2 and 4 are "odds multipliers," indicating here the multiplicative 
change in the odds of having participated in a given kind of political activity for a one unit 
change in a specific determinant, net of the influence of the other determinants in the 
regression equations (Demaris 1992).9 
Regression results for participation in protest demonstrations or rallies, or in 
AGGRESSIVE participation are given in the top two panels (A and B) of Table 2. As noted 
above, these two types of participation are of most interest to students of social movements. It 
also may be assumed that participation in these two types of activities took place within a few 
year period before the 1991 date of our survey -- primarily in the period from 1989-91. This 
increases the likelihood that the sociodemographic characteristics and social psychological 
states measured in 1991 were those that held at the time our respondents participated in a 
political activity. and strengthens our ability to make inferences about causal effects. 
Social Standing and Income Need have little to no statistically significant effects on non-
electoral participation in the postcommunist states. On the other hand, education does have 
statistically significant and strong effects on rally or protest demonstration participation in all 
countries, east and west (Table 2) Although coefficients for the effects of education are smaller 
for the post-communist states than for the western democratic states, they nevertheless indicate 
substantial differences across the range of education. 10 This is consistent with other studies in 
both the United States (Kinder and Sears 1985) and western Europe (Barnes and Kaase, 1979) 
which have also found education to be a better determinant of participation than income, 
occupation or class. Our data suggest that in all industrialized countries. education has more of 
an effect on political activity than do economic resources per se. 11 
9 An odds multiplier of greater than one indicates that the odds of participating increase with increases in the 
value of a given independent variable. An odds multiplier of less than one indicates that the odds of participating 
decrease with increases in the value of a given independent variable 
1°For example, the odds multiplier coefficient for East Germany indicates that the odds of having participated 
in a rally or protest demonstration increase by 35% ((1 - the odds multiplier) X 100); Demaris 1992) with each 
unit change in education. Compounded across the six unit range of the measure of education, a 35 % increase 
from unit to unit results in a quite large difference between the least and most highly educated strata in the 
predicted odds of having ever participated in a rally or protest demonstration. 
11We also have run regression models including actual income (in deciles) and occupational prestige, with the 
same results. We find little to no statistically significant effects of actual income or occupational prestige on 
non-electoral or electoral participation. 
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Education has a statistically insignificant effect on aggressive political participation in 
five of the eight post-communist states, and overall countries it is best characterized as having 
little to no effect on aggressive participation. As noted earlier, almost certainly the reports of 
aggressive political acts refer primarily to the demonstrations of the 1989-91 period. One 
would have expected, given both the role of education in other forms of participation and the 
prevalent role of intellectuals in the 1989 events, that education would also have been a factor 
here. These findings may reflect, however, that there were many different kinds of aggressive 
protest practiced in the years leading up to 1989--including, for example, strikes by (less 
educated) blue collar workers. 
This leads to another significant factor in these tables, the role of age. In all the 
postcommunist states, the elderly (those over 60) are less likely to participate than other age 
groups, though in some countries the dividing line is age 45. As expected from prior research 
(Muller 1979; Opp 1989), aggressive participation is very much a function of age, with those 
under 30 most likely to engage in such behavior. The only exception to this in the post-
communist states is Poland, where the 30-45 age group was more likely to engage in 
aggressive protest than their younger colleagues. This makes sense in that this is the 
"Solidarity" generation--those who were the younger and activist generation in 1980-81 who 
forged Solidarity, kept it alive underground during the 1980s, and re-emerged to confront the 
regime again in 1988-89. For all other countries, though, it was young people who were more 
likely to have engaged in the disruptive strikes and demonstrations of 1989. 
While young people were more likely to have participated in non- electoral political 
action, it is older people who are more likely to sympathize with political parties and who are 
more likely to vote (Panels C and D of Table 2). This pattern holds for virtually every country 
in both east and west. As is the case for non-electoral participation. electoral participation 
increases with education in postcommunist and western countries alike. 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
In Eastern Europe, a steep economic decline beginning in the 1970s, combined with the 
increased openness of the media in the late 1980s, fueled widespread personal 
dissatisfaction. 12 As we previously noted, however, in order for personal dissatisfaction to be 
12We did not attempt to measure personal dissatisfaction retrospectively, but a question asked in 1991 is likely 
indicative in the aggregate sense of how widespread it was. On a scale ranging from "1, • indicating complete 
dissatisfaction with one's income, to •7•, indicating complete satisfaction, 46 percent of respondents from 
postcommunist countries chose scores of I or 2. The corresponding percent for our western respondents is 14. 
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consequential it must be cast in an "injustice" frame. Table 3 (page 28) gives an indication of 
how collective economic and political troubles translated into the perceived personal experience 
of injustice in six realms that are comparable across the ten countries (excluding perceived 
injustice due to region or race). 
We see in Table 3 that, with the exception of perceived injustice due to "lack of money," 
the economic and political troubles of the communist period did not straightforwardly translate 
into perceived injustice in the domains we measured. In general, the substantial majority of 
respondents from the postcommunist states reported that they "never" experienced an injustice 
due to political beliefs, gender, social background, age or religion in each of these areas 
considered individually. 13 
The dimension of perceived injustice due to political beliefs is of particular interest. 
Barnes and Kaase (1979) propose that in addition to being seen in injustice terms, a deprivation 
must be attributed to the actions of political authorities if heightened political action is to 
result. Also, this dimension relates to the experience of political repression, which has been 
shown to motivate increased participation (Opp and Roehl 1990; Opp and Gem 1993). 
The three postcommunist countries with the highest rates of non-electoral political 
participation -- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (Table 1) -- also are the three 
countries with the highest levels of perceived injustice due to political beliefs. These same 
three countries, however, do not differ systematically from other postcommunist nations in 
perceived injustice due to other causes. On a simple correlational level, this seems to support 
the proposition that perceived injustice must be attributed to the action of political authorities to 
encourage political action. 
We tested this proposition by regressing participation on the set of perceived experiences 
in Table 3. For space reasons, we do not present the results here. They show. however. that 
perceived injustice due to political beliefs has consistent effects across countries on non-
electoral participation. Of the other dimensions of experienced injustice, only perceived 
injustice due to one's sex has statistically significant partial effects. Correspondingly, we 
include only perceived injustice due to political beliefs (Political Injustice) and due to one's sex 
(Gender Injustice) in our subsequent regression models. 
Before interpreting the regression model results (Table 4, pages 29-30), we need to 
comment on the issue of causal ordering. It well may be argued that political participation 
13Taken collectively, 33 percent of postcommunist respondents report "never" having experienced an irtjustice 
in any of the six areas, and 23 percent report 
experiencing an injustice in only one area. 
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shapes beliefs and values, as well as being shaped by them (cf. Ferree 1992). Lacking 
longitudinal data, we cannot reliably estimate reciprocal effects involving participation and our 
social psychological factors. No one has argued, however, that the relationship is strictly from 
participation to social psychological traits. Moreover, longitudinal evidence from other 
research supports assuming that the preponderant direction of influence is from social 
psychological factors to participation (Opp 1988; Opp and Gem 1993: p. 670). Logical 
considerations as well favor this assumption in postcommunist countries. Political grievances, 
and social and moral dissatisfaction with the communist regimes, of course, were forged over 
decades of communist rule. However, the major opportunities to act on these grievances and 
dissatisfactions were not presented until the middle to late 1980s. 
Table 4 presents logistic regression results for the effects of social psychological factors 
on non-electoral and electoral participation, net of the effects of sociodemographic variables. 
Preliminary tests of linearity and additivity were run before concluding that the models in 
Table 4 are the best representation of how social psychological factors shape participation. 
Opp (1989) calls attention to a possible influence of ideological extremism, such that 
those on both the extreme left and extreme right of the ideological spectrum will be more 
strongly motivated to participate in collective action, especially so in "rebellious" action. This 
implies a possible nonlinear, "U-shaped" effect of Egalitarian Statism, Favor Socialism and 
Post-Materialism on participation. One also may speculate that the effect of personal grievances 
is nonlinear, e.g. following a "threshold" pattern such that political action only results when 
people report experiencing extensive injustice. Our tests of non-linearity (not presented here), 
however, showed that in all countries a linear relationship well summarizes the relationship of 
each of our social psychological tests to political participation. 14 
Value Expectancy Theory proposes that the perceived effectiveness of political action has 
a multiplicative influence, such that the effect of grievances and norms on participation 
increases as the perceived effectiveness of political action increases. We tested for this possible 
multiplicative relationship by including interaction terms for Social Justice is Possible with 
Gender Injustice, Political Injustice, Egalitarian Statism, Favor Socialism and Post-Materialism 
in models that also included sociodemographic variables and main effect terms for the social 
14To test for nonlinearity, logistic regressions were run with sets of categorical variables representing the 
social psychological variables and coefficients examined for patterns indicating non-trivial departures from 
linearity (Demaris 1992). We also ran such tests for the effects of Education, Income Need, and Social 
Standing reported in Table 2. These tests showed that the effects of these sociodemographic variables likewise 
are each well summarized by a linear relationship. 
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psychological factors. Results of these tests for interaction were uniformly negative in 
postcommunist countries. We found significant interaction effects in the U.S. and West 
Germany for Social Justice is Possible and Egalitarian Statism only -- on Aggressive 
Participation and on participation in a Rally or Protest Demonstration. These were in the 
direction predicted by Value Expectancy Theory, such that the effect of Egalitarian Statism on 
non-electoral participation is stronger when someone indicates a belief that it is possible to 
change things to realize social justice. 15 
The first (left hand) column of Table 4 gives coefficients for the effects of education on 
participation net of social psychological factors. By comparing it to coefficients in Table 2 we 
get an estimate of how much of the effect of education is mediated through social 
psychological factors. This comparison shows that in postcommunist countries the effects of 
education on non-electoral participation and on Party Sympathy arrayed in Table 4 are 
substantially smaller than parallel effects in Table 2. 
The mediation of education effects in postcommunist countries reflects two sets of 
relationships. First, it is due to the consistent effects across postcommunist countries of 
education on the social psychological factors we consider here. Regression results (not shown 
here) show that in all postcommunist countries the highly educated felt they experienced the 
most injustice due to their political beliefs, expressed the highest level of inegalitarian 
opposition to socialism, are the most "postmaterialist," and have the highest levels of perceived 
effectiveness of political action (identifying reference). 
Second, it reflects that social psychological factors do have statistically significant effects 
on non-electoral participation and Party Sympathy in postcommunist and western countries 
alike. Perceived Political Injustice has a strong and consistent effect on both Aggressive 
Participation and participation in a Rally or Protest Demonstration. Overall. Aggressive 
Participation is less strongly shaped by other social psychological factors than is Rally or 
Protest Demonstration Participation. Social Justice is Possible and Post-Materialism have little 
to no statistically significant influence. In both West Germany and the U.S. people who 
endorse Egalitarian Statism, i.e. egalitarians, have higher rates of participation in aggressive 
political activities. In Hungary, Poland and Russia, Egalitarian Statism also has a statistically 
significant effect on Aggressive Participation, but opposite the effect in the west. Consistent 
with the economic inegalitarian nature of the Revolutions of 1989, it is the anti-egalitarians in 
15Because the estimates of coefficients for the effects of other social psychological factors are the same in 
models for W. Germany and the U.S.A. that include or do not include interaction terms, for ease of 
presentation, in Table 4 we give terms for the main effects only of Justice is Possible and Socialist Principles. 
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these countries who were involved in aggressive activities. Net of Egalitarian Statism (and 
other factors), persons who Favor Socialism were significantly less involved in Aggressive 
activities in Bulgaria and Poland. 
Participation in rallies or protest demonstrations is substantially more a function of social 
psychological factors than Aggressive Participation. In the West, all of the social psychological 
factors have statistically significant and substantial effects on participation in protest 
demonstrations or rallies. Although the significant effects of Social Justice is Possible, Post-
Materialism, and Egalitarian Statism are less consistent across postcommunist countries, the 
overall pattern is much the same. In most postcommunist countries, participants in rallies and 
protest demonstrations were motivated by the experience of political injustice, the sense that 
political action is efficacious, a higher value given to political freedom than to order, 
opposition to socialism and inegalitarianism .16 
Two contrasts involving electoral participation are notable. First, in West Germany and 
the U .S.A, Party Sympathy was little affected by any of the social psychological traits. but 
each of the traits has statistically significant effects in postcommunist countries. Political 
Injustice, and Postmaterialism have effects across the board, and Gender Injustice, Social 
Justice Possible, and Egalitarian Statism have statistically significant effects in three, five and 
four of the postcommunist countries respectively. Second, in contrast to Party Sympathy, social 
psychological factors essentially have no effect on voting in any of our countries. 
ACTIVIST PROFILE 
To address the question of the representativeness of political activists during the early 
transition, we created a variable, Type of Participation. with three categories: (1) "Non-
Participants" -- those reporting no participation in any of the nine types of non-electoral 
participation, (2) "Participants" -- those with a participation level greater than zero but less 
than the level of Activists, and (3) "Activists" -- those with a participation level in the top 15 
percent of total non-electoral participation in each country. Fifteen percent is a rough cutoff for 
identifying an "Activist." We chose it because it provides a convenient whole number cutoff 
16East Gennaoy and Slovenia are notable exceptions for the lack of significant effects of Favor Socialism and 
Egalitarian Statism on participation in rallies or protest demonstrations, and non-electoral participation in 
general. This may be due to a strong influence of nationalism on the desire for political change in each of these 
countries. 
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point in each country, and because we feel that it at the least quite likely "surrounds" the true 
population of political activists in each country. 17 
Table 5 (page 31) gives mean sociodemographic characteristics by Type of Participation 
and Table 6 (pages 32-33) gives mean values for social psychological factors by Type of 
Participation. The sociodemographic profile of activists (Table 5) in all postcommunist 
countries is one of a younger person, much more highly educated, somewhat more likely to be 
male, and someone with slightly higher social standing than others. It is much the same for 
West Germany, and the U.S.A; although the profile in the U.S. is a bit more representative, 
with a roughly equal mean age for Activists and others, and a nearly equal gender composition 
among Activists. 
The social psychological profile of the activist is one of the aggrieved. In postcommunist 
countries it is largely the politically aggrieved; there are statistically significant differences 
indicating higher gender grievance among activists in Poland and Russia only. In the west it is 
both. In West Germany and the United States women activists report substantially higher levels 
of experience of injustice due to their sex, and activists in general report a higher level of 
experience of injustice due to their political beliefs. The activist also tends to be more 
convinced of the efficacy of action to promote social change than the nonactivist. This contrast 
is especially pronounced in West Germany and the U.S. 
Activists in postcommunist countries were more opposed to socialism -- both in principle 
(Egalitarian Statism) and in name (Favor Socialism). Opposition in name, however, varies 
among postcommunist nations. There are no statistically significant differences between 
activists and nonactivists in opposition to socialism in East Germany and Estonia. and stronger 
differences in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria than in Russia or Slovenia. 
In the U.S., activists are more inegalitarian (more opposed to Egalitarian Statism) than 
non-participants, but not more so than the participants. In West Germany there are no 
significant differences in egalitarianism. These results are consistent with the argument of 
Verba et al. (1987), at least on this central dimension of inequality-policy relevant attitudes. In 
all countries but Hungary, activists are more postmaterialist. 
The profile for electoral participation again contrasts Party Sympathy and voting in 
postcommunist states. Activists in all postcommunist countries have a higher percentage who 
sympathize with a political party than both participants and non-participants. With the 
17We also examined means for sociodemographic and social psychological variables across the entire 10 value 
range (0 through 9) of the total participation measure. We found that these means "flattened out" at the fifteen 
percent cutoff -- i.e., there are little to no differences among the means of these variables for total participation 
categories equal to or greater than the fifteen percent cutoff value. 
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exception of the U.S., where the difference in reported voting is pronounced. self-reported 
Vote does not differ either significantly or non-trivially by Type of Participation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our analyses have implications in two broad areas. First, 
they speak to the generality of models of political participation developed in the west to the 
postcommunist states. Nonelectoral and electoral participation are affected in much the same 
way by sociodemographic factors in the postcommunist and western regions. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this extends to the choice of whether or not to vote. Postcommunist youth are 
following in the footsteps of their western counterparts by having significantly lower odds of 
voting than older generations, even in light of the hard battles fought to win the right to vote. 
Consistent with a rational actor assumption, nonelectoral participation is shaped in much 
the same way by social psychological factors in all countries. We have seen that in all 
countries experienced injustice is consequential for participation, but only when it is given an 
explicitly political attribution. 
Consistent with Value Expectancy Theory and the arguments of Barnes and Kaase, 
normative beliefs influence non-electoral participation in both the western and postcommunist 
regions. However, we have found limited support for the importance Value Expectancy Theory 
ascribes to the perceived efficacy of political action. Perceived efficacy consistently adds to 
other factors shaping non-electoral participation and sympathy with a political party in the 
west. We have found evidence for the proposed mediating influence of the perceived efficacy 
of political action only in western countries, and only for the effect of Egalitarian Statism. Our 
failure to find stronger support for this key proposition of Value Expectancy theory may be 
due to our use of a single item measure that concerns the efficacy of action for change in 
general -- rather than of the perceived efficacy of specific political actions, as does Opp. 
However, Opp's own research (1988) has shown little to no mediating effect for perceived 
efficacy of action in the case of political grievance. A finding we clearly confirm. 
Social psychological factors have a substantial effect on sympathy with political parties 
among respondents in the postcommunist countries, but not in the west. This may reflect the 
stability and relative simplicity of party structures in the west, compared to the fluidity and 
complexity of party structures in the newly democratized postcommunist countries. 
Second, our findings have implications for understanding political change during the 
transition era. Within postcommunist countries, a strong contrast exists in the determinants of 
political protest, on the one hand, and voting on the other. While youth, political anger, and 
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socio-political ideology seem to have been the primary determinants of the former, they are not 
factors in the latter. So in all of the post-communist states, there seem to be two different 
constituencies: those who sparked the protests that led to the collapse of the communist 
regimes; and those who elected their successors. 
As we have seen in Table 1, large majorities of the populations participated in the first 
free elections in every one of the postcommunist states. It is clear from our data in Table 4 
that the decision to vote was made largely irrespective of grievances and social and political 
beliefs. These first votes, then were largely non-ideological, and more a reflection of 
patriotism, rejection of the communist order, and support for democracy. 
Sympathy with a political party, however, was in important part ideological -- motivated 
in most postcommunist countries by personal grievance, the perceived efficacy of political 
change, and social and political beliefs. In the early transition period, there was both high 
selectivity on ideological grounds and an overall low level of party sympathy per se due to the 
rather chaotic structure of political party organization in all of these countries in 1991. 
In the early years of the transition, this worked to the great advantage of the transitional 
governments in eastern Europe. These governments were uniformly committed to a rapid 
transition to capitalism, although some favored a somewhat slower pace than others. But the 
people that were most likely to oppose the extent or pace of such reforms were not yet 
politically organized. In the absence of strong political parties on the left at that time, and the 
discredited nature of the former communist parties, there was no real political counterweight to 
the neo-conservative parties and leaders that were in charge at that time. Thus, it was almost 
inevitable that once these constituencies were organized. and political parties formed to voice 
their concerns, that the political environment would be transformed. The steady rise of leftist 
political parties, and their strong electoral showings in the second round of elections in many 
of these countries, seems to bear out this conclusion. 
We have seen that at least in the early transition era political activists in the 
postcommunist states were equally as "unrepresentative" of the populations of their respective 
countries as their western counterparts on many dimensions. They are more unrepresentative 
than western counterparts, however, on two important dimensions, Egalitarian Statism and 
Party Sympathy. This strongly implies that antiegalitarians in the early transition were the most 
influential group in determining the political agenda. 
As we have seen from our data, economic circumstances did not significantly affect 
political participation in this transitional period, though attitudes towards the economy did. 
Those who were most likely to participate -- the highly educated, politically aggrieved, and 
pro-market -- would, of course, be most likely to take advantage of and benefit from the new 
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system of political and economic liberalization. In most countries in the region, it is this group 
that seems to have dominated and directed the transition process, at least in its first years. 
Indeed, as some analysts of the transition process have argued (e.g. Kolarska-Bobinska 
1994; Milor 1994) the new political elites in some of these countries (especially Poland) 
adopted a "shock therapy" approach in order to accomplish the market transition before the 
opponents of such reform could organize themselves into political parties and interest groups. 
Studies of earlier economic adjustment programs in other parts of the world (e.g. Chile, 
Jamaica, Philippines) found that success in such efforts was usually associated with a "disabled 
opposition" in the political sphere (Nelson 1989; Haggard and Kaufman 1989). 
Our findings suggest that this was indeed the case in the early years of the transition 
process in the post-communist states, where the likely opponents or skeptics of the market-
oriented reforms were largely politically inactive. As we pointed out earlier, this was due in 
part to the lack of any effective political parties or interest groups to represent this constituency 
early on in the process of democratization. As studies of political participation in the west have 
pointed out, upper class citizens can become politically active and effective on their own, but 
lower-status groups "need a group-based process of political mobilization" and need 
organization as a resource to compete with the higher-status groups (Verba, Kim and Nie 
1987: 14-15). 
In eastern Europe, these upper status groups and individuals, including the intellectuals 
and professionals who played such a big role in the revolutions and the post-communist 
governments, were able to accomplish a great deal without having permanent political 
organizations to back them up. The rest of the population, less educated, less enthusiastic about 
the changes, and more vulnerable to them, needed organization as a resource. In most of the 
post-communist states, they did not have such organization, in terms of either political parties 
or interest groups, through at least the first three or four years of the transition process. By the 
time such organizations did emerge, with the revival of the former communist parties and the 
development of European-style social democratic parties, many of the major changes in the 
economies of these countries had already taken place. 
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L,ble 1. lfon•Electoral !Ind ElectoreJ Political Partic10a1100 bv C,,untrv. ISJP. 1991. 
Non-Electoral Participation 
~ Ever Participated) 
PUBLIC 
LETTER NEWSPAPER PETITION MEETING RALLY BOYCOTT AGGRESNE 
Sulgaru.i 5.0 7.4 20.8 4.3.1 20.1 7.4 7.0 
CzecnosIu,'.lkia 5.9 10.0 40.4 51.4 30.5 10.9 17.9 
East Germany 11.1 13.7 62.1 66.7 43.4 4.5 4.4 
Estonia 2..5 4.8 16.5 16. 1 8.4 1.8 3.0 
Hungary 0.7 2..3 7.0 6.9 6.6 3.7 2..4 
Poland 3.2 4.3 13.8 11.e 8.8 S.9 9.7 
Russia 5.8 9.1 15.4 5.0 9.9 4.8 8.0 
Slovenia 1.1 3.6 19.1 16.J 13.2 8.9 5.6 
Wat.Germany 9.7 19.2 55.3 43.3 Zl.2 11.5 7.6 
USA 48.0 28.7 80.1 71.1 22.0 21.1 8.5 
8ectOraJ Pruticioation 
PAR1Y 
SYMPATHY VOTE Sample Size 
("" Ye:s) ("'Yes) 
Bulgaria 1.405 
Czechoslovakia 33.0 93.5 1.181 
EasiGem,any 53.4 84.4 1.019 
Estonia 14.8 1,000 
Hungary 37.9 715.2 1,000 
Poland 12.9 71!.5 1,542 
Rl.lssia 7.S &U 1,734 
Slowtnia 20.4 1,375 
West.Germany 69.7 88.8 1,837 
USA 88.6 70.3 1,414 
Notes: ANY is defined such lhat ·1 • indicates participation in any form of nonelectotaJ political activity and -0- lndicate:s no 
participation in any such forms of parocipation. AGGRESNE is a variable indicaling p.at1icipalion in 81\y one ol three activities 
disrupting traffic. occupying a building. or an unofficial strike. Individual forms ct pal'1:icipalion are as defined in the text. 
MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION is the average number of non-electoral activities out of nine total activities. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 is the excluded (reference) category. 
S
ee text for definitions of variables. 
Table 3. Perceived Experience of Injustice - ISJP, 1 991 
Experienced Injustice Due to ... 
POLITICAL ONES SEX SOCIAL 
BELIEFS (women only) BACKGROUND 
% 11ever11 mean % "ever" mean % "ever" mean 
Bulgaria 34.6 1.86 31.0 1.58 36.1 1.81 
Czechoslovakia 43.6 1.95 52.5 1.99 39.1 1.78 
East Germany 46.2 1.93 32.5 1.52 26.4 1.46 
Estonia 25.2 1.47 24.3 1.37 29.2 1.52 
Hungary 16.8 1.35 22.2 1.40 11.7 1.22 
Poland 24.4 1.47 18.7 1.30 24.0 1.40 
Russia 17.8 1.20 26.0 1.48 18.8 1.34 
Slovenia 19.8 1.36 32.5 1.58 33.6 1.60 
West Germany 25.8 1.45 46.0 1.85 30.2 1.52 
USA 32.1 1.47 57.9 2.09 45.0 1.72 
ONES AGE LACK OF MONEY RELIGION 
% "ever'' mean % "ever" mean % "ever" 
Bulgaria 32.3 1.65 43.0 2.05 17.4 
Czechoslovakia 35.0 1.60 51.2 2.01 25.5 
East Germany 25.9 1.45 30.8 1 .51 19.3 
Estonia 28.1 1.47 60.1 2.39 11.1 
Hungary 16.5 1.28 31.6 1.63 13.7 
Poland 17.1 1.29 47.6 2.00 18.0 
Russia 24.1 1.44 52.7 2.25 7.1 
Slovenia 23.8 1.40 55.1 2.16 17.4 
West Germany 31.9 1.55 41.6 1.70 17.0 
USA 47.3 1.79 59.5 2.13 31.2 
Notes: Perceived Experience of Injustice has a response format from (1) "never'' to 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Is the excluded (reference) category. 
S
ee text for definitions of variables. 
T
he results presented In this table are 
from




Table 5. 'v1ean Sociodemoaraohic Characteristics bi'. Level of Total Particioation - ISJP, 1991 
AGE 
Bulgaria Czech. E. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
Tvee of Participation 
Non-Participant 49.03 52.01 49.56 47.16 48.94 47.45 43.46 42.9 50.93 44.54 
Participant 40.76 42.36 44.95 44.48 42.66 41.36 40.85 44.64 44.48 
Activist 39.41 38.99 41.60 42.15 41.06 42.87 37.43 35.43 39.28 42.74 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 N.S. 
Eta 0.29 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.04 
EDUCATION 
Bulgaria Czech. E. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
T:tee of Particication 
Non-Participant 4.49 3.39 3.46 4.04 3.24 3.15 3.96 3.01 3.23 3.67 
Participant 5.32 4.12 3.96 4.36 3.94 4.67 3.38 4.05 4.56 
Activist 5.70 4.49 4.56 5.13 4.72 4.29 5.32 4.17 4.91 5.48 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.36 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.39 0.33 
GENDER 
(proportion male) 
Bulgaria Czech. E. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
T:z:ee of Particioation 
Non-Participant 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.43 0.33 
Participant 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.39 0.54 0.47 0.44 0.52 0.44 
Activist 0.56 0.65 0.59 a.so 0.58 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.58 0.52 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 P < .a, p < .05 p < .01 p < .01 N.S. p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.09 
SOCIAL STANDING 
Bulgana Czech. c. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
Tyee of Participation 
Non-Participant 3.66 4.44 4.79 4.73 4.14 4.37 3.88 4.19 5.45 5.49 
Participant 4.10 4.67 4.77 4.90 4.82 4.10 4.26 5.89 5.79 
Activist 4.28 5.08 4.96 5.07 4.n 4.88 4.58 4.66 5.92 6.04 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 N.S. N.S. p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.08 
Notes: N.S. indicates that the differences among means are not statistically significant. A •Non-Participant" reported no participation 
in any of the nine kinds of non-electoral participation. An •Activist" reported a level placing her or him in the top fifteen percem of the 
distribution of total non-electoral participation. A "Participant" has a level of total non-electoral participation greater than zero but not 
in the upper 15 percent. 
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Table 6. Mean Social Psvchoto9ical Characteristics bv T:z:ee of Participation - ISJP, 1991 
GENDER GREIVANCE 
(women oniy) 
Bulgaria Czech. ::. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
T:r:ee of Particication 
Non•Participant 1.49 1.90 1.46 1.33 1.37 1.25 1.35 1.49 1.60 1.75 
Participant 1.71 2.03 1.48 1.44 1.42 1.59 1.74 1.81 2.00 
Activist 1.72 2.08 1.87 1.55 1.71 1.60 1.86 1.81 2.48 2.73 
Significance p < .05 N.S. p < .01 p < .05 N.S. p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.26 0.24 
POUTICAL GREIVANCE 
Bulgaria Czech. E. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
Ttee of Particication ·"" ... 
Non-Participant 1.58 1.75 1.60 1.36 1.30 1.30 1.11 1.30 1.31 1.50 
Participant 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.50 1.64 1.25 1.44 1.40 1.39 
Activist 2.50 2.51 2.42 1.96 1.63 2.18 1.52 1.50 1.89 1.78 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 P < .o, p < .0'1 
Eta 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.17 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IS POSSIBLE 
Bulgaria Czech. E. Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Gennany 1 USA 
T:tee of Particioation 
Non-Participant 2.67 2.64 2.87 2.00 2.57 2.51 2.67 2.97 2.69 2.98 
Participant 2.97 3.16 3.29 2.04 2.69 2.94 3.14 3.29 3.63 
Activist 3.14 3.25 3.60 2.29 3.17 2.88 3.10 3.69 3.76 4.40 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .05 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.26 
EGALITARIAN STATISM 
' Bulgaria Czech. ::. Germany ::stonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany "·· USA 
Ttee of Particioation 
Non-Participant 3.38 3.32 3.78 3.07 3.66 3.43 3.36 3.41 3.24 2.8_6 
Participant 2.93 3.00 3.71 3.03 3.06 3.05 3.29 3.13 2.42' 
Activist 2.71 2.68 3.52 2.65 3.10 2.99 2.91 3.03 3.18 2.45 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .05 p < .01 
Eta 0.27 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.14 
FAVOR SOCIALISM 
Bulgaria Czech. E.Germany Estonia Hungary Poland Russia Slovenia W. Germany us,; 
T:tee of Particioation 
Non•Participant 2.81 2.62 2.61 2.33 2.53 2.75 2.86 
Participant 2.37 2.40 2.60 2.50 2.30 2.67 2.60 
Activist 1.85 1.95 2.70 2.24 1.96 2.41 2.49 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 N.S. N.S. p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.26 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.15 
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,able 6 (ccn11nueo1 
?OST-MA TER!AUSM 
Bulgana :.zech. ::. Germany Estonia Hungary ?olano C'USSia Slovenia W. Germany USA 
Tvpe or Partic1cauon 
,\lon-P art1c1cant 1.8 2.05 2.02 1.79 1.51 1.65 1.78 2.14 2.35 2.48 
Particicam 2.09 2.38 2.40 1.92 1.72 1.97 2.48 2.75 2.49 
Activist 2.33 2.65 2.69 2.08 1.57 2.04 2.06 2.51 3.33 2.95 
Signiticanca P < .01 ;: < .01 -~ < .01 p < .05 'J.S. p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
Eta 0.21 'J.21 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.31 0.17 
?ARTY SYMPATHY 
::ulgana :.:acn. =· 3ermanv =~onra :-:.Jngary =dano =uss1a Siovan,a W. Garmany -SA 
Tvce or Part1c:ca11on 
,...,on-.=-aruc1cant ·J.30 0.41 0.11 0.34 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.63 0.84 
?anic1cant 0.31 0.53 0.19 0.14 0.11 O.Z3 0.70 0.88 
Activist 0.44 0.64 0.31 0.62 0.31 0.18 0.36 0.70 0.92 
Significance p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 N.S. 
Eta 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.20 O.Z3 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.06 
VOTE 
Bulgaria :zecn. ::. Germany Estonia Hungary ?olano C'USSia .Slaven1a W. Garmany USA 
Tvce or Partic1cauon 
Non-Part1c10ant 0.93 0.81 0.74 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.41 
Participant 0.93 0.84 a.so 0.86 0.90 0.71 
Activist 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.86 
Significance N.S. N.S. p < .01 p < .01 .·~.s. p < .OS p < .01 
Eta 0.02 0.02 0.10 'J.07 'J.04 0.06 0.24 
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